Maine Law Review
Volume 64
Number 2 Symposium:
Balancing Fairness With Finality:
An Examination of Post-Conviction Review

Article 8

June 2012

Contingent Compensation of Post-Conviction Counsel: A Modest
Proposal to Identify Meritorious Claims and Reduce Wasteful
Government Spending
Christopher T. Robertson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher T. Robertson, Contingent Compensation of Post-Conviction Counsel: A Modest Proposal to
Identify Meritorious Claims and Reduce Wasteful Government Spending, 64 Me. L. Rev. 513 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

CONTINGENT COMPENSATION OF POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL: A MODEST PROPOSAL TO
IDENTIFY MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND REDUCE
WASTEFUL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Christopher T. Robertson, J.D., Ph.D.
I.
II.
III.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF WASTE INCARCERATIONS
COMPENSATION OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL AS A SOLUTION
OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WASTE
CONCLUSION

514

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:2

CONTINGENT COMPENSATION OF POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL: A MODEST PROPOSAL TO
IDENTIFY MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND REDUCE
WASTEFUL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
*

Christopher T. Robertson, J.D., Ph.D.

It costs about $25,000 per year to pay for the housing, food, medical care, and
security for each of the 2.3 million residents of America’s prisons.1 In a world of
limited public budgets, each of these expenditures represents an opportunity cost –
a teacher’s aide not hired, a section of road not widened. Local, state, and federal
governments pay such incarceration costs, which amount to $75 billion in the
aggregate, while slashing budgets for essential services for the rest of the citizenry
including medical care, biomedical research, infrastructure, and educational
funding – investments which arguably provide greater returns to taxpayers.2
It is hard to resist the allure of some form of “justice reinvestment” that would
move funds to areas that might produce greater social return, and indeed states have
been experimenting with ways to save money by getting prisoners out of prison.3
A Michigan reentry program is saving $118 million annually.4 Texas is saving

*

Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.
chris.robertson@law.arizona.edu. Thanks to Sam Issacharoff for helpful comments, and to Germar
Townsend and Maureen Dowd for excellent research support. Disclosure: the author has represented
prisoners on post-conviction petitions.
1. JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER, & SARIKA GUPTA, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF
INCARCERATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-201006.pdf; Direct Expenditures by Criminal Justice Function, 1982–2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/exptyptab.cfm (last visited Mar. 23,
2012).
2. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, More States Limiting Medicaid Hospital Stays, USA TODAY, Oct. 31,
2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-23/states-limit-medicaid-hospitalstays/50886398/1 (Arizona simply stopped paying for certain organ transplants. Hawaii simply refused
to pay for hospital stays of more than 10 days for most patients, regardless of whether the patient can be
safely discharged.). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRATEGIES TO LEVERAGE RESEARCH
FUNDING: GUIDING DOD’S PEER REVIEWED MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS 47 (Michael McGeary &
Kathi E. Hanna eds., 2004), available at http://nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11089 (discussing
sharply reduced state funding for biomedical research); Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, Grading
the States ‘08: The Mandate to Measure, GOVERNING, Mar. 2008, at 32-34, available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Grading-the-States-2008.pdf (discussing state cuts
to infrastructure spending); Phil Oliff & Michael Leachman, New School Year Brings Steep Cuts in
State Funding for Schools, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?Fa=view&id=3569 (discussing state cuts to education spending).
3. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear, A Private-Sector, Incentives-Based Model For Justice Reinvestment,
10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 585 (2011).
4. Glenn Gilbert, Success of Michigan Prisoner Re-entry Initiative Allows Granholm to Close
Prisons, Save Money, OAKLAND PRESS, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.theoaklandpress.com/articles/
2009/09/06/opinion/doc4aa2fbfc7c9f4919330267.txt.
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$210 million by increasing probation and parole as an alternative to incarceration.5
Several states recently have created fiscal incentives for local justice systems to
reduce their recidivism rates, and the United Kingdom is experimenting with a
program to create private-sector competition to reduce the rates of incarceration.6
Post-conviction litigation could also serve those goals.
The paper seeks to leverage the cost-savings agenda by observing that, at any
given time, a significant number of those incarcerated in state and federal prisons
should be released, not as a matter of social policy but simply on account of the
facts and law of their cases. Incarcerating these people is government waste, just as
when the government builds bridges to nowhere.7 Even a purely rational
government – with no commitment to liberty or concern about the problem of mass
incarceration – would seek to minimize that waste. The problem is that we
presently have no way of identifying which prisoners meet that criterion.
This contribution to a symposium on post-conviction litigation argues that the
lack of properly-incentivized counsel is a primary problem with our failing system
of habeas litigation. The lack of counsel causes a great flood of frivolous petitions
by pro se prisoners, while also preventing prisoners with meritorious claims from
getting relief. The lack of counsel, and more fundamentally, the lack of funding
therefor, thus perpetuates the problem of incarceration waste. Government-funded
contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel may be the most promising
way to help courts identify the bona fide cases deserving of relief, providing more
accurate justice and saving money on net.
In Part I, I lay out the problem of incarceration waste, identifying the types of
prisoners who should be released even under current law and foreseeable changes
thereto. I also show that, without a constitutional or statutory right to counsel, even
those prisoners that are being wastefully incarcerated are unable to persuasively
reveal that status to their captors.
In Part II, I present a proposal for rational governments to pay post-conviction
counsel, but do so through a contingent fee system that would incentivize the
attorneys to identify such prisoners and cogently present their cases to prosecutors
and courts. Such a contingent funding system would be more politically feasible,
since it does not shower money upon prisoners who deserve to be there, and it
creates the proper incentives for attorneys to provide a screening function for the
most meritorious cases.
In Part III, I identify other structural and doctrinal impediments to
governments achieving a rational policy for reducing incarceration waste, and
suggest that they be reconsidered through this lens. I conclude that, although
government-paid contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel may be a
useful way to get representation for those prisoners that have the most meritorious
claims, and to save some money for governments on the margins, it is very far from
a solution to the overwhelming problem of mass incarceration.

5. Texas & Mississippi: Reducing Prison Populations, Saving Money, and Reducing Recidivism,
ABA
CRIM.
JUSTICE
SECTION,
http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/
CR203800/PublicDocuments/paroleandprobationsuccess.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
6. See Clear, supra note 3 (reviewing these trends).
7. Herein, references to “the government” include federal or state governments.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF WASTE INCARCERATIONS
Much dispute attends the theoretical bases for institutionalized prisons, and the
United States policy of mass incarceration is the topic of many other papers. One
could assert a radical thesis that incarceration is itself wasteful, to the extent that it
is a sub-optimal mechanism for addressing the problem of criminality in society.
Or, one could assert the somewhat narrower claim that, on the margins, there are
certain sorts of criminals for whom any incarceration, or such long periods of
incarceration, are unwarranted for meeting social goals of deterrence and
punishment. The “war on drugs” or “mandatory minimums,” for examples, may be
very bad policies.
Regardless of the merits of the broader claims on criminal justice policy, this
paper offers the very modest suggestion that, even within our current paradigm of
incarceration law, there are prisoners who should not be incarcerated at all, or not
incarcerated for as long as they will be incarcerated. This narrower concept of
incarceration-as-waste presents some low-hanging fruit that does not require any
broader reexamination of the underpinning of current criminal law and policy.
Understood in this sense, incarceration waste exists because our pretrial and
trial procedures do not perfectly sort those that should be incarcerated from those
that should not. William Stuntz has previously tied the extent of incarceration to the
inadequacy of process protections: “Americans [have] chosen, at least tacitly, to
punish millions more criminal defendants than in past generations, [and] we have
also chosen to do the punishing with less justification and with sloppier
procedures.”8 There is a real risk of false positives – those that are in prison but do
not belong there.
First, consider factual and procedural problems. Though estimates vary
considerably, it is likely that several percent of the current prison population were
wrongly convicted in the first place, due to some mixture of false eyewitness
testimony, unreliable forensic science, ineffective assistance of counsel, or the
misconduct of police or prosecutors.9 Some of these facts may only come to light
after the trial proceedings are complete. Allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel are often the vehicle for presenting claims of innocence (alleging that
8. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 264 (2011).
9. This literature is vast, but for a recent review, see Jon B. Gould and Richard A. Leo, One
Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832 (2010) (“Virtually no one denies the existence of wrongful convictions, while
the several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to 5% of convictions.”). For a sense of
the controversy compare Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2538, 165 L. Ed. 429, 456-57 (2006)(J.
Scalia concurring, endorsing an estimate that the wrongful conviction rate for felonies is .027 percent,
quoting a recent op-ed article by Joshua Marquis, District Attorney of Clatsop County, Oregon) with D.
Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2006-2007) (estimating “a minimum factually wrongful conviction
rate for capital rape-murder in the 1980s” as 3.3%, but suggesting that this is “likely a serious
underestimate”). For another leading voice, see Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008) (arguing that precise estimates are difficult, but suggesting “that
the frequency of wrongful death sentences in the United States is at least 2.3 percent”). See also Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325-26 (1995) (actual innocence); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58
(1970) (misconduct).
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counsel failed to investigate exculpatory evidence, for example), and several
circuits have held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised on
direct appeal, but can only be raised in post-conviction proceedings.10 Petitioners
raising ineffective assistance claims generally must show prejudice -- that the trial
attorney made objectively unreasonable decisions that affected the outcome of the
case.11 Thus, to the extent that these prisoners have meritorious claims, they will
lead to reductions in prison time. When those meritorious claims about factual
innocence and procedural irregularities are not presented, or not presented well, the
prisoners remain incarcerated, which is waste.
In addition to the foregoing actual innocence claims and procedural problems,
errors in judicial interpretations of the law also create false positives. Periodically,
our understanding of the substantive and procedural law changes in ways that
undermine the validity of prior convictions. Landmark changes to procedural
rights and most changes to the substantive law that effectively decriminalize prior
behavior or reduce the sentence therefor, may be retroactively applicable to those
who are currently imprisoned.12
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) proscribes the “use” of a firearm in the
commission of a drug crime, and prior to 1995, prosecutors and courts had
construed that crime broadly to cover situations where the defendant had simply
had a gun in the general vicinity of drugs or proceeds. In the 1995 Bailey v. United
States decision, the Supreme Court instead held that the statute’s “use” element
requires the Government to show “active employment of the firearm” in the
crime.13 Prisoners who had been convicted under the broader reading were thus
instantaneously rendered innocent of that crime. Many of these claims had never
been considered on direct appeal, or if considered were rejected given clear
authority predating Bailey. “The United States Sentencing Commission later
estimated that between 1,500 and 2,200 federal defendants per year had been
convicted under the broader reading of the statute that was ultimately rejected by
the Court.”14
In addition to such statutory claims, there are instances in which the Supreme
Court, or a lower court, narrows or strikes down a state or federal statute for
conflicting with the Constitution.15 Such a decision makes prisoners instantly
10. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2242 (2009).
11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2011) (“The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review . . . .”); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989) (holding that cases that either place conduct beyond the power of
lawmaking or that create watershed changes in criminal procedure could be applied retroactively to
prisoners).
13. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 616-24 (1998) (discussing the post-conviction applicability of Bailey, and particularly whether the
petition should be barred by the notion of procedural default).
14. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES,
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 115 (2011) [hereinafter KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS]
(citing Report of Firearms Policy Team, Sentencing for the Possession or Use of Firearms during a
Crime (January 2000), 5, http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/firearms.PDF).
15. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931, 2934-35 (2010) (retroactively
narrowing the honest services fraud statute on due process vagueness concerns).
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innocent as their crimes are struck out of the criminal statutes. Given the Supreme
Court’s emboldened approach to Constitutional scrutiny in the First Amendment,
Second Amendment, and Commerce Clause domains, we might reasonably expect
more such Constitutional exonerations in the future.16
Congress and the Federal Sentencing Commission also sometimes change the
sentencing laws or guidelines in ways that retroactively shorten sentences. They
did so recently to reduce the differences between prison sentences for crack versus
powered cocaine, a disparity that had an onerous impact upon racial minorities.17
Many who advocate for changing the national policy of mass incarceration call for
similar legislation that could lead to current prisoners getting shorter sentences, in
addition to changing sentencing policy prospectively.18
Altogether then, the government and the prisoner have aligned interests in this
subset of cases where the prisoner has a meritorious claim that he should be
released prior to the conclusion of his sentence. The prisoner seeks his freedom,
and the government seeks to stop wasting funds incarcerating those that should not
be incarcerated. Presumably, the government also has a principled commitment to
desist from wrongfully incarcerating its citizens, though this commitment may
sometimes be less salient for policymakers, who may feel little solidarity with their
imprisoned and disenfranchised constituents.19 Prisoners form the classic insular
minority who are unlikely to command the attention of the political process for
their own sake.
Even if the government were to acknowledge this fiscal interest in reducing
improper incarceration in the aggregate, the problem is that the government does
not know, with particularity, which of its millions of prisoners should be released.
In fact, even the prisoner himself often will not know whether he has a meritorious
claim for release (although he may well hope and believe). Both these parties need
help in order to discover whether their interests are in fact aligned. But
particularized information is costly. That information simply does not exist until
an attorney -- who takes the time and some outlay of expenses to investigate the
facts and law of the case -- creates that information.

16. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct 1577, 1582-83, 1593 (2010) (using the First
Amendment to strike down the statute proscribing creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal
cruelty); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (using the Second Amendment to strike
down gun laws). As of the time of this writing, it appears that the Supreme Court has some likelihood
of striking down the Affordable Care Act, on Commerce Clause grounds. A vast portion of federal
crimes are justified on that same Constitutional basis.
17. John Schwartz, Drug Terms Reduced, Freeing Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/terms-for-crack-cocaine-reduced-freeing-prisoners.html
(discussing the reforms to the crack cocaine sentencing disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and
the Federal Sentencing Commission’s decision to make those changes retroactive). See also Arthur H.
Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans: What History and the First Decade of
Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 2011 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 87, 97 (discussing Federal
Sentencing Commission estimates that retroactive application would affect over 12,000 prisoners).
18. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform Amid Mass Incarcerations-Guarded Optimism,
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 27-28; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (2004).
19. See generally, Rosanna M. Taormina, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the
“Usual Residence” Principle, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 (2003).
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An attorney is essential to a successful post-conviction petition.20 “Proceeding
pro se is particularly dangerous because state [and federal] post-conviction
procedures are generally marked by strict pleading requirements, inflexible filing
deadlines, elaborate preclusion doctrines, and other technical pitfalls that cannot
practicably be navigated without highly skilled counsel.”21 It is particularly
dangerous to proceed pro se or with unskilled post-conviction attorneys, because a
botched job may actually make matters worse, effectively waiving whatever claims
the prisoner could have made properly.22
Public defenders’ focus their efforts on plea negotiations, trials, and direct
appeals, not on post-conviction litigation, and the budgets of non-profit
organizations and law school clinics can barely scratch the surface of the prison
population.23 Thus, for a prisoner to get post-conviction counsel, he or she must be
able to pay for it. This is, of course, a significant challenge for a prisoner who may
have been impoverished prior to his arrest, and even if wealthy may have
bankrupted himself paying trial and appellate counsel. Once in prison, the few
dollars a day working in the prison laundry, at less than even the minimum wage,
do not even start to pay the rates demanded by skillful post-conviction counsel.24
Oddly, over half the states have statutes allowing compensation for those who
are wrongly convicted and later exonerated, but no compensation for the attorneys
who achieve that outcome.25 Federal capital defendants do have some statutory
rights to compensated counsel.26 Some states provide very minimal compensation
for attorneys representing capital prisoners, but most states provide no

20. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 349 (2003) (“These recent changes
[to the post-conviction relief statutes] place an incalculable premium on competent representation by
talented, adequately funded lawyers.”).
21. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 354 (2006).
22. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (holding that indigent defendants have
no remedy for claims that are barred by a post-conviction lawyer’s malpractice).
23. Diane E. Courselle, When Clinics Are “Necessities, Not Luxuries”: Special Challenges of
Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in a Rural State, 75 MISS. L. J. 721, 726-27 (2006) (“Given its
limited resources and some legal restrictions, the state public defenders handle very few state postconviction and no federal post-conviction matters . . . .The hardest part of the task is learning to turn
down possibly meritorious post-conviction cases, even though without the clinic’s help an inmate may
have no other resources for assistance.”).
24. See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners are not
entitled to federal minimum wage protections).
25. See Reforms by States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/
LawView1.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (select “State Compensation Laws” from the drop-down
menu).
26. For indigent federal prisoners seeking to vacate a death sentence, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)
(2011) entitles them to appointed counsel. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2261(b)-(c) (2011)
(“AEDPA”), incentivizes states to create a system for the “appointment, compensation, and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel” in capital cases, in exchange for a dramatically
shorter statute of limitations. However, few (or no) states have taken advantage of this provision. See
Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”):
Understanding the Failures of State Opt-in Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1981 (2007)).
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compensation at all for non-capital prisoners.27 A plurality of the Supreme Court
has said that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, even for death-sentenced inmates.28 The statutes provide that federal
prisoners are not entitled to appointed counsel unless they can first formulate a
compelling claim for relief that itself requires effective discovery and/or an
evidentiary hearing, or alternatively if they can persuade the court that “interests of
justice so require.”29 Of course accomplishing these predicate tasks would
normally require the skills and resources of an attorney, making it an exquisite
Catch-22.
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of post-conviction petitions
are written by prisoners pro se, and thus it is not surprising that most petitions fail,
often without even reaching the merits.30 All this chaff hides any wheat, and
wastes judicial resources too. Meanwhile, many meritorious post-conviction
claims are never even asserted, since only an attorney would recognize the basis for
relief.
It thus seems clear that the lack of legal representation is a large part of the
31
problem with post-conviction litigation.
Many pro se petitions fail to meet
rudimentary standards of comprehensibility, much less present colorable legal
32
arguments. In capital cases, 92.9% of the petitioners have attorneys, but in non33
capital cases, only 7.7% have attorneys.
A simplistic comparison of outcomes
shows that the capital defendants are 35 times more likely to get relief (12.4% of
34
the time versus 0.35% of the time).
While it is possible that this difference in
outcomes is because capital cases are more prone to error, or that courts are more
receptive to capital defendants, some of that disparity is likely due to the fact of
27. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 276 n.97
(2006). See also Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644, 650 (Fla. 2002) (discussing Florida’s provisions for
compensation of post-conviction counsel in death penalty cases).
28. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion). But see Jackson v. State, 732
So. 2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (holding that state capital prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel).
29. Rebecca C. Raquet & Sara Stainback, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 89 GEO. L.J. 1832,
1870-71 (2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (2000)).
30. See Stevenson, supra note 21, at 355; KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS supra note 14, at 81-82
(discussing the low rates of success), 147 (showing that 92% of non-capital petitioners proceed without
counsel).
31. Nonetheless, scholarship on the efficacy of representation is mixed in its findings and in its
reliability. See, e.g., Daniel J. Greiner & Cassandra Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make? 121 YALE LAW
JOURNAL (forthcoming 2012) (reviewing this literature and presenting a randomized trial of efficacy in
the civil context) and Daniel J. Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan P. Hennessy, The
Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and
Prospects for the Future, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948286.
32. See Joseph Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y TIMES, April
16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/opinion/17hoffmann.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter
Hoffmann & King, Justice] (“Because more than 90 percent of all non-capital habeas petitions are filed
by prisoners acting as their own lawyers, the petitions are often difficult to decipher in the first place.”).
33. See KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 147.
34. Id. There appears to be no prior scholarly research providing a more sophisticated analysis of the
impact of representation in the post-conviction context. See generally Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note
31 (reviewing the substantial literature in a variety of other fields).
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representation, which is so disproportionately distributed across those two groups.
Although far from a complete analysis, this data suggests that representation of
non-capital prisoners could lead to a small, but significant, number of releases.
II. COMPENSATION OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL AS A SOLUTION
These observations suggest that state and federal governments are suboptimally incentivizing the production of post-conviction counsel services to
accomplish the rational goal of identifying and eliminating wasteful incarcerations.
From a strictly rational and fiscal point of view, government should invest in the
production of this sort of information insofar as the cost of that information is
lower than the cost of continued incarceration.
The most obvious way to undertake such a program of investment would be
for the government to significantly increase its funding for the public defender
system, so that the public defenders could allocate a significant portion of their
work to post-conviction litigation. The advantage of this approach is that public
defenders already have a familiar place and expertise in the American system of
criminal litigation. A disadvantage is that public defenders lack any incentive to
pursue such cases vigorously, and the salaries offered by these offices may fail to
attract the strongest candidates to undertake this highly-complex work.35 More
importantly, we lack any clear sense of what level of investment in such an office
would be optimal, since we are unaware of how many meritorious claims exist and
how much work and skill will be required to reveal them. And finally, it seems
that additional spending on public defenders may be politically infeasible, as it is a
crude policy that seems to serve the guilty more than the innocent.
Alternatively, a program of investment could be based on the private market
for legal representation and based on a contingent fee paid if, and only if, an
attorney succeeds in reducing the sentence of a prisoner. This reduction in
sentence, and thus a reduction in the government’s cost of incarceration, would
create the corpus from which to pay the attorney. The fee could be based on a
simple proportion of that estimated amount saved, say 50%. Alternatively, like the
statutory fee paid to civil rights attorneys for prevailing parties, the payment could
be based on a “lodestar” rate, derived from a reasonable hourly rate but multiplied
by a factor to recognize the low chances of prevailing.36 The award could still be
capped, however, by the estimated amount saved by the government, again to
ensure that this program is money-saving on net. The attorney securing the release
would have the burden of proving his entitlement for fees, just as in other
litigation.37
35. See New Findings on Salaries for Public Interest Attorneys, NALP (September 2008),
http://www.nalp.org/2008sepnewfindings (tables showing that public defenders are paid salaries
significantly lower than attorneys at private law firms, for example in 2008, $47,000 for an entry-level
public defender versus $80,00 for a private attorney at the smallest-sized firm and up to $145,000 at
larger firms).
36. See Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing lodestar in civil rights
context). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595,
636-37 (1993) (discussing the Independent Counsel Act, which provides contingent compensation to
attorneys who represent executive branch officials who are subject to investigations).
37. See 20 C.J.S. Costs § 169 (2009) (party requesting fees has burden).
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The advantage of a contingent fee is that it incentivizes precisely what the
government needs – a search function in which attorneys efficiently sort the wheat
from the chaff, identifying those prisoners that have meritorious claims for postconviction relief. Such contingently-funded attorneys will have no incentive to
clog the courts with frivolous claims for post-conviction relief, since any such
claim would require the investment of time and money without promise of return.38
Because the payment is only triggered by a recognition that the prisoner should not
be imprisoned, such targeted and purposeful public funding may be more
politically feasible than unconditional funding for public defenders, whose
professional obligation will invariably be to help the innocent and guilty alike.
This proposal encounters the ethical rule against attorneys accepting
contingent fees for criminal work, embodied in Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.5(d)(2). The rule provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not enter into an
arrangement for, charge, or collect . . . a contingent fee for representing a defendant
in a criminal case.”39 Arguably, its plain language would not apply to the postconviction setting, since a prisoner is no longer a defendant in a criminal case, but
is instead a petitioner in a civil case (albeit one seeking to overturn his criminal
conviction).40 In addition, even in formal terms, the arrangement is not a
contingent representation from the client, but a government offer for the successful
representation of the innocent.
Even supposing that the rule would apply to cases like this, there are good
reasons to think that it should not. Historically, scholars and policymakers were
hostile to contingent fee arrangements generally, but the proscriptions have been
eroded in almost every sector, except for criminal litigation.41 In a seminal article
on the rule, Pamela Karlan has argued that “courts and commentators have offered
only sketchy justifications for” maintaining the rule in the criminal context.42 The
one official justification for the rule appears in the Model Code’s Ethical
Consideration 2-20: “Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements
in criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.”43 Aside from the merits of this
justification, it obviously does not apply to the present proposal for public funding
of post-conviction counsel, which is motivated by the idea that there is in fact a res,
namely the savings from the cost of incarceration.
38. Compare Hoffman & King, Justice, supra note 32 (stating that “the never-ending stream of
futile petitions suggests that habeas corpus is a wasteful nuisance” under the status quo), with Karlan,
supra note 36, at 630 (discussing a similar dynamic in civil cases: “commentators generally assume that
this sort of gatekeeping in damages cases is good, at least insofar as it screens some cases out of the
system, because it provide[s] the first line of defense against frivolous litigation.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). See also A. C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for
Allocating Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1174-76 (1997) (arguing for
contingent payment for government-funded appellate counsel in order to create proper incentives to
invest in the most meritorious cases).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2011).
40. See White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that civil procedures apply to
Section 2255 petitions).
41. See Karlan, supra note 36, at 602.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20(2) (1983)).
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A second traditional justification for the ban on contingent fees is that in
criminal cases, unlike civil cases, defendants enjoy a Constitutional right to counsel
(paid by the state if necessary), making the contingent-compensation of counsel
unnecessary.44 The thinking is that a contingent fee, which the rule-writers saw as
inherently suspect, is just not necessary in this context. However, as already noted,
there is no Constitutional right to counsel in the post-conviction setting.45
In light of these failures of the traditional justifications, Karlan provides her
own alternative justifications for the ban on contingent fees in criminal litigation.
One concern is cross-subsidization of the costs of defense, in a way that seems
normatively troublesome. The problem is that contingent criminal fees would
cause those who succeed in litigation and thus pay the fee – those defendants
adjudged to be innocent, to cross-subsidize the costs of litigation for those who fail
in litigation – defendants adjudged to be guilty.46 This concern clearly does not
apply to the present proposal since the government pays the contingent fee rather
than the innocent person.47 There is no problem of cross-subsidization across
defendants.
Karlan also argues that the gatekeeping function inherent in contingent fees,
whereby attorneys are incentivized to select the cases with the best chances of
success, would be inappropriate in the criminal setting. “To permit, let alone
systematically encourage, attorneys to choose clients based upon an assessment of
guilt or innocence would mean that ‘[t]he private judgment of individual lawyers
would in effect be substituted for the public, institutional judgment of the judge and
jury.’”48 Karlan acknowledges that this concern is predicated on “the constitutional
entitlement to counsel accorded all criminal defendants,” which does not apply
here.49 Thus, the idea that attorneys would sort frivolous from meritorious claims,
and focus their efforts on the latter, is not problematic. Instead, it is exactly what
we need – someone to perform the function of revealing which prisoners’
incarcerations are wasteful. For these reasons, it appears that Rule 1.5(d)(2) would
not and should not bar the government from paying post-conviction attorneys
conditional on success.50
One problem with my proposal to think about post-conviction litigation as a
means of cost savings is that incarceration is conducted on an industrial scale,
44. Id. at 603-04.
45. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
46. Karlan, supra note 36, at 625 (“Thus, if innocent defendants choose a contingent fee
arrangement, they will pay a premium tied not only to error costs in their class of cases, but also to the
lawyer’s need for compensation in cases in which the system reaches accurate verdicts against guilty
defendants.”).
47. Karlan herself endorses the concept of a government-paid bonus system for defense counsel.
See id. at 634-35.
48. Id. at 631 (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (1975)).
49. See id. at 630.
50. For other discussions of the ethical prohibitions, see generally Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise
of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1992); Adam Silberlight,
Gambling with Ethics and Constitutional Rights: A Look at Issues Involved with Contingent Fee
Arrangements in Criminal Defense Practice, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2004); and Lindsey N.
Godfrey, Note, Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense Approach to
Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (2001).
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where the marginal cost to imprison one extra person may not be the same as the
average cost. The bonds on the buildings must still be repaid, and the guards must
still come to work, regardless of whether one person succeeds in getting his
sentence shortened or overturned.51 Still, many states have already squared this
circle by enacting “pay to stay” laws, which calculate an approximate cost per
inmate and then impose it upon those few inmates that are able to pay those costs.52
While such laws are often symbolic (since most prisoners are destitute), they
suggest that it is possible to put a sizeable dollar figure on a day of incarceration.
State and federal governments are also increasingly using private prisons.53 In
that context, the problem of determining a meaningful and sizeable marginal-cost
of imprisonment disappears because “almost all the planned or existing private
prisons operate on a per-diem, per capita basis.”54 Thus, for jurisdictions that have
outsourced their incarceration function with these sorts of contracts, each prisoner
released creates a direct reduction in expenditures. Marginal cost is average cost in
that situation.
Some governments also have severely overcrowded prisons, and are facing
judicial mandates to dramatically reduce prison populations.55 These governments
should be interested in any proposal that could reduce prison populations, even if
only in modest numbers. They should be particularly interested in removing the
prisoners that do not belong there in the first place, since “high recidivism rates
must serve as a warning that mistaken or premature release of even one prisoner
can cause injury and harm.”56 The present proposal is a narrow and tailored way to
reduce prison populations, focusing on those who do not belong there anyway.
While the proposal does not purport to solve larger issues of incarceration policy or
overcrowding, it does help on the margin.
For the remainder of governments, my proposal relies on the hope that postconviction litigation may reduce enough sentences to create an aggregate cost
savings. If the economic argument ultimately founders, one might retreat to the
familiar position that government should err on the side of liberty, getting people
out of prison that do not belong there.

51. See Clear, supra note 3, at 592 (discussing another proposal for using incentives to reduce
incarceration: “If 1 year of incarceration costs an average of $40,000, then the 16 people who do not go
to prison will ‘save’ $640,000. These savings are not real, of course, because diverting 16 people from
prison does not enable the corrections system to close a prison, so its budget remains essentially
unaffected”).
52. See Joshua Michtom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay For Their Stay: How A Popular Correctional
Program Violates The Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 187, 188-89 (2004) (“The first state
to enact legislation allowing the recovery of general incarceration costs was Michigan, in 1984. Since
that time, at least fifteen other states have enacted similar laws.”).
53. See Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison, and William J. Sabol, U.S. Department of Justice Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2010, 7 (revised 2012) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
(“About 16% of federal prisoners (33,830) and nearly 7% of state prisoners (94,365) were housed in
private facilities[.]”).
54. David Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE
L.J. 815, 831, n.92 (1987).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (holding that California’s overcrowded prisons
violate the Eighth Amendment).
56. Id.
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III. OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WASTE
Even if the government invested optimally in creating advocates for the
prisoners that should be released, there are other structural, statutory, and doctrinal
impediments to securing such releases at optimal rates. These suggest further
opportunities for reform once governments take seriously the problem of
incarceration waste.
The first problem is that the habeas decisionmakers may be unable to assess
the merits of petitions objectively. Confirmatory bias is the psychological dynamic
by which people tend to discount information that conflicts with what they believe
and to instead focus upon information that coheres with what they already
believe.57 The federal habeas statutes are a recipe for such bias because they send
petitioners back to the same prosecutors and judges that made the original
mistakes, wrongly interpreting a statute or wrongly crediting the testimony of a
lying witness, for examples.58
The quickest and cheapest way to resolve a case of incarceration waste is for a
prisoner to garner the prosecutor’s consent to his release, and in a time of fiscal
austerity, one could imagine government executives exercising their discretion to
instruct their line-prosecutors to consent to a prisoner’s release when he or she
presents a colorable claim. Of course, without such executive-level direction, line
prosecutors will routinely resist any suggestion that the prisoner that they worked
so hard to put away should be released, as that would mean that the prosecutor had
been part of a terrible injustice.59 In order to get a more objective assessment of
whether incarceration waste exists, the government could place the review of postconviction petitions in the hands of an independent office, not unlike the Office of
the Inspector General, which roots out waste in other federal government
agencies.60 One could also imagine a rational government reinstituting the use of
parole boards and expanding their discretion to consider claims that the law
61
requires release. Such uses of executive discretion are likely to be cheaper to the
government than litigation in the courts.

57. See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation To Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 512, 516-18 (2007); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138-48 (2004).
58. Section 2254 requires that state prisoners first exhaust their remedies in state court, and then the
federal courts defer strongly to state court determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011). Section 2255
requires filing in the district court that imposed the original sentence, regardless of the prisoner’s place
of incarceration. Id. § 2255(a) (requiring that the petition be filed in “the court which imposed the
sentence”).
59. For example, even after the Supreme Court narrowed the firearms use statute in Bailey, a
subsequent defendant convicted under that statute, Kenneth Bousley, still had to go all the way back to
the Supreme Court to get relief. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616-18 (1998) (discussing the
post-conviction applicability of Bailey). There are contrary examples, where prosecutors themselves
became champions for releasing innocent prisoners. See Mark Godsey, False Justice and the ‘True’
Prosecutor: A Memoir, Tribute, and Commentary, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 789 (2012).
60. See Winters Ranch P’ship v. Viadero, 123 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
Inspector General Act of 1978).
61. See generally, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno M. Garoupa, & Joanna Shepherd, Legislatures,
Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1037, 1045-47 (2010) (discussing the historical movement away from parole board discretion).
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If an entreaty to the prosecutor fails, a post-conviction petitioner then asks the
trial court to admit that it deprived the petitioner of his due process rights,
misinterpreted the law, or otherwise somehow failed to reach the right outcome in
the case. The judge reviewing the post-conviction petition is likely also to suffer
from confirmatory biases, no matter how hard she tries to be fair. Obviously a
judge would disqualify herself if she thought she would be biased, but as the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]ias might exist in the mind of one who was
quite positive that he had no bias.”62 The Supreme Court has also recently held
that due process is violated when a judge decides a case where there is a strong
appearance of possible bias.63 In this light, it is anomalous for our post-conviction
statutes to give trial judges the primary task of determining whether error occurred
in their own prior cases.
To make matters worse, appellate review of post-conviction denials is very
circumscribed. The petitioner is not even allowed to appeal the trial court’s
decision on the petition, unless the trial court or circuit court grants him permission
to do so.64 In the rare instance that a petitioner gets a “certificate of appealability”,
he then must go back to the same court of appeals – and often the very same panel
– that denied his direct appeal.
If legislators were to take seriously the problem of incarceration waste, they
might consider changing the venue requirements to instead allow fresh eyes to
review convictions, at least in those cases where attorneys have identified cases as
being potentially meritorious, worthy of investment of their own time. The
disadvantage of such a venue change is that the new judge may lack familiarity
with the facts of a case, which the prior judge may have. Of course, this is a
contingent claim that would seem to depend on a particular judge having accurate
and useful memories of one case, out of the thousands he has processed. In many
cases, were memories are limited, the judge will need to be provided with the facts
through briefing and perhaps an evidentiary hearing. While facts can be provided
to a new judge, nothing can remove the confirmatory bias from the mind of the
prior judge. Thus, on net, a change of venue seems likely to serve accuracy in
post-conviction determinations, and be close to neutral with regard to efficiency.
Aside from the venue statutes, there are also a variety of judicial and statutory
doctrines that perpetuate incarceration waste, purportedly to promote “finality” in
criminal sentencing. One such impediment is the statutes of limitations, which
prevent meritorious, but stale, claims from being heard. The allowed periods tend
to be very short. For example the federal period for post-conviction petitions is
one-year, which is on the short range for such statutes generally and indeed one
fifth of the five-year period that prosecutors enjoy to put people into prison in the
first place.65 Aside from the facial disparity, the short period is particularly
onerous for petitioners who are imprisoned, without income or access to attorneys.
62. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).
63. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (a case where a state court judge
had benefited from significant campaign contributions from a litigant).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012) (creating a one-year period for filing post-conviction petitions);
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012) (creating a default period of five years for prosecution of most federal
crimes).
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Does a short statute of limitations make sense in this context? Notably, the
incarcerating government is not like a civil defendant who seeks “repose,” a
confidence that he will not face future liability. Instead, the government is making
payments on a judgment every month for the costs of incarceration. From this
perspective, a statute of limitations may be irrational, to the extent that it prevents
meritorious claims from being heard. If it is justified at all, a short statute of
limitations must serve the government’s interest in minimizing transaction costs,
allowing courts and prosecutors to quickly dispose of the non-meritorious cases.
For the reasons suggested above, however, it is unlikely that contingently-paid
attorneys would bring many such cases.
Although the structure and statutes for post-conviction review are onerous,
several court-made doctrines further circumscribe the possibilities for reducing
incarceration waste. Supreme Court doctrine has held that most reforms to
criminal procedure will not be retroactively applicable to other petitioners whose
rights were admittedly violated prior to the Supreme Court recognizing that their
rights were violated.66 The doctrine of non-retroactivity ensures that people will
continue to be imprisoned who otherwise would be released if the contemporary
understanding of the applicable law were applied to their cases. Without any basis
in the statutory law, the judiciary has unilaterally decided that it will not consider
such cases, and thereby externalizes the cost of incarceration onto the taxpayers.
The court-made doctrine of “procedural default” likewise functions to keep
people in prisons who should not be there, according to our contemporary
understandings of the law.67 The idea is that a defendant who has failed to raise a
challenge on appeal cannot later benefit from the Supreme Court deciding in
another case that the challenge was meritorious. There are certain exceptions,
predicated on whether the defendant can show that the question goes to the trial
court’s jurisdiction, or that the defendant had cause for not raising it and was
prejudiced, or finally that he is “actually innocent.”68 The Supreme Court has
(sometimes) said that, even though a claim may have been entirely futile, that does
not demonstrate “cause” for failing to assert it.69
Moreover, the Supreme Court has articulated the “actual innocence” standard
oddly and incoherently. District courts are supposed to prognosticate about
whether any “reasonable” juror would convict in light of the changed law and new
evidence, rather than discerning what a full jury of twelve would decide, as
guaranteed by the Constitution.70 Even though “properly instructed” jurors would
presume innocence and place the burden on the prosecutors, the Supreme Court
66. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989) (holding that only those cases that place
conduct beyond the power of lawmaking or that create watershed changes in criminal procedure could
be applied retroactively to prisoners).
67. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998).
68. See generally, id.
69. Id. at 623. But see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (where “the state of the law at the time .
. . did not offer a ‘reasonable basis’ upon which to challenge the [plea],’ [it] constitutes ‘cause for failing
to raise the issue at that time.’”).
70. Compare Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995) (petitioner must demonstrate that “no
reasonable juror would have convicted him.”) with U.S. CONST. art. III and U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(right to a jury trial) and Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (the Constitution requires a jury of
twelve) and Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740 (1948) (the jury’s verdict must be unanimous).
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seems to require that the petitioner prove his innocence, under a new standard to
which he never confessed guilty.71 In that inquiry, the Supreme Court sometimes
says that the trial court should consider even inadmissible evidence, and other
times suggests the contrary.72 Further, even individuals who are indisputably
innocent of the crime of their conviction nonetheless will continue to be
incarcerated, unless they can prove their innocence of other charges, which the
government has never even brought or proven.73 These other hypothetical charges
can become the post-hoc justification for continued incarceration, unless the
petitioner can prove his innocence thereof, without the benefit of a right to a jury,
which is somehow waived by pleading guilty to other (invalid) charges. Even aside
from fundamental fairness and due process, the idea of incarceration waste suggests
that the prosecutors should instead bear the burden of showing why public funds
should continue to be used to incarcerate someone who is actually innocent of the
crime of their conviction.
There is thus a range of statutory and court-made obstacles to rooting out
incarceration waste. Of course, there are also costs to consider on the other side of
the ledger. Post-conviction review imposes a burden on prosecutors and courts,
and sometimes it may be more efficient to simply deny prisoners a meaningful
review. (Whether it is just or fair is of course another question.) Still, the idea of
incarceration waste suggests that, even aside from notions of fundamental fairness,
there are reasons to keep open the doors to post-conviction review. And, besides,
the contingent funding of post-conviction attorneys is likely a more accurate and
efficient way to sort the wheat from the chaff.
IV. CONCLUSION
This symposium article has argued that a lack of counsel is a primary problem
with our failing system of post-conviction litigation, and the idea of incarceration
waste presents a counterbalance to the traditional preference for finality in criminal
sentences. Just as other forms of governmental waste can be efficiently rooted out
and extirpated from state and federal budgets, the wrongful incarceration of
prisoners – who do not belong there, under even our current understandings of the
law, can also be excised.
To be sure, contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel is not the
solution to our irrational system of mass incarceration. That will take changes to
substantive criminal laws and sentencing policy, along with more aggressive efforts
to exonerate the wrongfully convicted.
The idea of incarceration waste is a modest reminder that the government and
some of the imprisoned have aligned interests in identifying those that should be
71. Compare Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624 (putting the burden on “petitioner [to] demonstrate … that he
did not ‘use’ a firearm as that term is defined in Bailey”) with Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)
(trial court's failure to give instruction on presumption of innocence resulted in violation of defendant's
right to fair trial.).
72. Compare Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624 (“the Government is not limited to the existing record but
may present any admissible evidence of petitioner's guilt”) with Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 (“the district
court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial”).
73. See Bousley, 523 U.S at 624 (requiring that the petitioner prove innocence of “foregone
charges”).

2012] CONTINGENT COMPENSATION OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL 529
released. A rational government would, at the very least, provide contingent
funding to attorneys who successfully perform that service, and moreover review
its other statutes and doctrines that place unreasonable impediments on the
achievement of this policy goal.

